Political Science

Beenish Pervaiz is a seventh year Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Brown University and a 2023-24 USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar. She is also an incoming Research Fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Managing the Atom and International Security Program for 2024-2025. Prior to her doctoral program, she completed a Master's degree in International Policy Studies from Stanford University. Her research interests comprise of nuclear politics and strategy, emerging technologies, and national security decision-making. In particular, she explores the decisions guiding nuclear policies in Southern Asia, assessing the impacts of deterrence theory, strategic stability, and alliance politics on nuclear escalation risks and arms buildup.

Beenish has contributed to the field of international security policy through her work with the Nuclear Threat Initiative and her role as a 2021 Center for Strategic and International Studies PONI Nuclear Scholar. She has also been involved with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) as a youth organizing member. Beenish has shared her insights at prominent nuclear policy forums such as the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, the Stimson Center’s South Asian Voices, BASIC’s Programme on Nuclear Responsibilities, the Strategic Force Analysis Boot Camp, Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) Nuclear History Boot Camp. In addition, Beenish’s strong passion for, and dedication to, teaching was recognized with the P. Terrence Hopmann Award for Excellence in Teaching from Brown's Department of Political Science in 2020.

Beenish's Ph.D. dissertation examines the nuclear dynamics between Pakistan and India, focusing on why and how regional nuclear powers engage in vertical nuclear proliferation. She seeks to understand how alliance politics and strategic partnerships have shaped the qualitative growth of Pakistan's and India's arsenals post-1998, with an emphasis on their nuclear delivery systems, such as aircraft and missiles. Her research underscores the significance of alliance politics in driving arms buildup and contributing to the security dilemma in South Asia. Such alliance dynamics can frequently undermine non-proliferation efforts by creating inconsistencies in non-proliferation pressures and fostering perceptions of discrimination and selective enforcement. The fear of third-party patronage for a rival state compels these regional nuclear programs to enhance domestic capacity and leverage external support to diversify their nuclear portfolios. Increasing international non-proliferation pressures may inadvertently create perceived windows of opportunity for vertical proliferation, subsequently prompting the acceleration of nuclear programs. Beenish’s work critiques Cold War arms racing models, exploring how regional nuclear programs adapt to non-proliferation pressures and develop countermeasures to circumvent resource and technological constraints. Through in-depth analysis, she provides insights into the complex and interconnected nature of regional nuclear dynamics in South Asia, emphasizing the non-dyadic nature of the underlying deterrence model and the strategic chain that links multiple nuclear states. Beenish’s arguments are considerably supported by an array of qualitative research methods that incorporate archival research and specialized sources such as military journals and expert interviews.

Job Market Paper Title

Delivering Deterrence: The Impact of Alliance Politics and Global Non-proliferation Policies on Vertical Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia.

Job Market Paper Abstract

How do global nonproliferation policies, led by external actors and organizations, shape the trajectory of vertical nuclear proliferation in non-NPT nuclear states like Pakistan and India? Despite the successful dissuasion of new nuclear states, global efforts have struggled to contain the expansion of existing arsenals. By concentrating on Pakistan's missile program following its status as a nuclear state in 1998, this study investigates how resource-constrained programs navigate demand and supply challenges. It analyzes three decades of nuclear decision-making, underscoring the relevance of alliance politics, strategic partnerships, and export control clubs. The paper argues that external factors, primarily intended to impose constraints on nuclear capabilities, contrarily fuel the resolve of states, thereby accelerating the pace and scope of nuclear programs. Inconsistencies in non-proliferation standards create expectations of narrowing procurement windows, influencing threat perception, and hastening acquisition. Lastly, this study argues that successful military innovation operationalization relies on foreign technology access and robust domestic organizational capacity.